Significance: This ruling established the requirement to inform people accused of crimes of their legal rights to silence and legal representation before anything they say can be used against them in court. This decision ruled that an accused person’s Fifth Amendment rights begin at the time of arrest. The ruling caused controversy because it could potentially interfere with bringing guilty people to justice.
Background: In 1963 Ernesto Miranda, a young man of limited education, was arrested for kidnapping and assaulting a young woman in Arizona. After two hours of interrogation, Miranda signed a confession and was later found guilty of the crime. The arresting officers, however, admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his rights to talk with an attorney or to have an attorney with him during questioning. Miranda appealed his conviction on the grounds that by not informing him of his legal rights, the police had violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Decision: This case was argued on February 28­March 1, 1966, and decided on June 13, 1966, by a vote of 5 to 4. Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke for the Court; Justices Tom Clark, John Harlan, Byron White, and Potter Stewart dissented. The Court ruled in Miranda’s favor, indicating that his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated at the time of his arrest. The Court decided that in order to protect an accused person’s Fifth Amendment rights, he or she must be given four warnings after being taken into police custody: (1) the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) anything the suspect says can and will be used against him or her, (3) the suspect has the right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney present during questioning, and (4) if the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided before questioning begins.
Excerpt from the Opinion of the Court: “Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed [restricted] in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently [basically] compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised [informed] of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”
